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1.  Introduction 
Prior to the completion of the lengthy negotiations on Chinese WTO Accession,
1 there was 
extensive debate inside China on the merits of this step from a Chinese perspective. This debate 
has continued despite the initiation of implementation of the terms of accession now due to be 
completed by 2007.  The talk in China today is of post-WTO China; and every new policy 
initiative is discussed not only in terms of its WTO compatibility, but also in terms of its ability 
to contribute to the implementation of the accession process and the eventual harnessing of 
China’s resulting WTO benefits.  The completion of  accession negotiations was been hailed 
internally as a milestone in China’s economic development, with claims of significant additions 
to growth potential, and a new policy environment underpinned by the single most important 
policy departure since Dung Xiao Ping’s introduction of the responsibility system in 1976.  At 
the same time, WTO accession has been criticized by detractors as establishing too quickly a 
western style market-oriented environment in China, which will likely lead to greater inequality 
and over-centralization, and has resulted in China giving away too many WTO bargaining chips 
which could have been more effectively used in later global negotiations.  
 
From outside, this discussion inside China seems orthogonal to recent discussion of the WTO 
elsewhere.  Globally there has until recently been pessimism on prospects for the completion of 
the Doha Round in 2005,
2 rejection of the WTO and global institutions by anti-globalization 
                                                 
1 These concluded with the adoption of the report by the WTO working party on Chinese Accession on November 
10, 2001. 
2 A significant change in atmosphere has occurred only recently.  In June 2004 at a meeting in Georgia the G-8 
countries following an EU initiative mutually agreed to terminate export subsidies in agriculture, removing a central 
impediment to forward progress in the agriculture negotiations in the Round. The EU have also removed all requests 
for a negotiation in competition policy and investment.  The G-8 claim is that this will enable progress to be made in 
July on a final package but developing countries remain cautious.  See Raymond Colitt, Financial Times, June 15, 
2004, and Frances Williams, Financial Times, June 23, 2004.   3
protesters, a sense of an overburdened and, at times, atmosphere-poisoned dispute settlement 
process in the WTO whose credibility is in some eyes increasingly becoming tarnished.
3  This 
pessimism is also compounded by growing acceleration of a seemingly post-Uruguay Round 
headlong rush into Bhagwati’s spaghetti bowl of overflowing and inconsistent regionalism, with 
multiple US and EU regional initiatives, and many other bilateral or small new group 
arrangements. 
 
The point of departure for this paper relative to the substantial literature on the possible impacts 
of Chinese accession
4 is to instead focus on China’s WTO situation in the post-Uruguay Round 
pre-Doha Round completion period.
5  We focus less on accession and more on issues 
surrounding China’s participation in the WTO post accession.   
 
China, for now, even though a large entity with a significant and ever more sophisticated 
delegation in Geneva and an active trade ministry in Beijing has been largely content to observe 
and try to better understand WTO process, rather than to actively promote new initiatives.  But as 
time moves on from 2002 and 2007 approaches, what China actually should and can do in the 
WTO is the issue. 
 
We ask a series of questions to help focus our discussion.  We ask how important is the WTO 
membership now achieved to China in terms of yielding traditional access benefits to markets 
                                                 
3 The atmosphere in dispute settlement has been adversely affected by critical US-EU cases in bananas and growth 
hormones, where due to the time limits on process agreed to in the Uruguay Round, multiple panels are spawned by 
a single initial dispute, and the reports of one panel are never finally accepted by all parties.  Other US-EU trade 
disputes such as steel have also contributed to this atmosphere. See for example, Helene Cooper, Wall Street 
Journal, April 12, 2001 or James C. Hecht, Law and Policy in International Business, 2000. 
4 See for example Elena Ianchovichina and Will Martin  (2003) The World Bank and Yang, Yongzheng (2003) 
International Monetary Fund. 
5 As such this seemingly goes beyond the discussion in Lardy (2002) World Bank (1997).   4
around the world if accession terms, as we believe, yield China little on dumping, and textiles 
and apparel?   Is the Chinese interest more in quality of access or security of access that China 
already has; and if the latter, what extra does WTO membership offer China on this score? Does 
WTO membership help with trade disputes or merely serve to generate more?  
 
In our discussion we largely put on one side the use of the WTO as a masthead to cement and 
underpin domestic policy reform, which was seemingly a major factor in the Chinese decision to 
seek accession, and we instead discuss a series of key short to medium term trade access issues.  
These include antidumping actions against China, a prospective new global trade regime in 
textiles and apparel following the end of the Multifibre Arrangement, and a growing list of trade 
conflicts both inside and outside the WTO.  We ask what WTO membership can potentially do 
for China in these areas.  We also ask how regional and multilateral trade strategies for China 
can best be commingled, and conclude with a discussion of how China’s interests in the WTO 
overlap with those of other larger emerging economies (India, Brazil, and Russia) and with the 
WTO plurality of medium to small poorer countries who formally can outvote all in the WTO? 
 
The two central arguments we make are firstly that China’s WTO membership seemingly 
changes little on her two central access issues of antidumping and textiles and apparel.  We also 
argue that the complexity both of the WTO agreements inherited on accession (around 26,000 
pages of text to the Uruguay Round decisions) and of current Chinese policy instruments provide 
the potential to generate many new trade disputes involving instruments of policy not previously 
encountered by the WTO.  
   5
We further argue that China has split interests in future trade arrangements. She has a global 
interest in using strong multilateral trade rules, similar to that of Japan in the 1960s, to allow 
relatively unhindered access to currently large EU and North American markets to fuel continued 
export growth.  But regionally and locally China can exert power in regional or bilateral 
negotiations to obtain preferential access to rapidly growing regional markets, but this is 
inconsistent with both the spirit and letter of multilateral rules.  We suggest that finding a way to 
combine these two interests in securing her market access interests will be central to China’s 
trade growth in the next few decades.   
 
China is well placed strategically to exert great influence over developments in the trading 
system in the next few decades if she chooses to exercise strong leadership among emerging 
powers in fora such as the G20. How the WTO will be changed by Chinese membership, and 
whether China’s accession terms may eventually be (de facto) renegotiated a little, are hence the 
final issues we discuss. 
 
2.  China’s Interest in the WTO 
There has been much discussion in the last few years of exactly what it was that took China into 
the WTO (or in Chinese eyes restored their GATT membership placed into suspension in 1950).
6  
Arguments range from the need to have the security of firm MFN benefits in place of previous 
insecure arrangements (and subject to periodic review and renewal), to the domestic uses of 
                                                 
6 On March 6, 1950, the Taiwan authorities notified the UN Secretary General of its decision to withdraw from the 
GATT. See: University of Toronto web site: China’s Accession to the WTO: A Chronology of Major Events between 
China and the GATT/WTO.   6
WTO membership by modernizers who wanted to see genuine market-based policy reform 
which would speed growth and reform and curb the power of provinces.
7  
 
In our view there was a deeper WTO accession debate in China, which should be seen as part of 
a longer historic discussion of China’s relationship with the outside world and one significantly 
coloured by Chinese engagement with the European powers in the late 19
th Century.  The central 
issue seems to be whether the world outside China was threatening to China and China should 
turn inward, or whether the outside world (and the WTO) represented a source of opportunity 
and modernization which China should embrace.  The broad question debated was thus the one 
of engagement versus isolationism with the world community, more so than the precise terms of 
accession to the WTO which were offered by the rest of the WTO membership in the accession 
negotiations.  The central argument in favour of accession was that China should pursue 
modernization and take its rightful place among the leading world powers in the global 
institutions, and WTO accession was the vehicle for this, not that the terms of accession were 
right.   
 
For the larger powers negotiating with China (especially the US, the EU) the accession process, 
in some contrast, was seen primarily as an opportunity to pursue commercial policy interest and 
was not about engagement or isolationism.  How could sharply improved access to a rapidly 
growing and potentially huge, if not dominant, market be secured, and at minimal cost in terms 
of formal reciprocal WTO commitments made to China?  At the time of the conclusion of 
                                                 
7 As Long Yongtu, the former chief Chinese negotiator on accession (2000).  “We must let those [WTO] rules that 
stand at the core of the market economy, and which have to be obeyed, take firm roots in our society and country, so 
that our own market economy may become one that is truly orderly, efficient, honest and clean.” See Long Yongtu, 
The Chinese Economy, 2000.   7
accession negotiations, parallel speeches from Chinese and EU/US negotiators talked from the 
Chinese side of a fair and balanced arrangement with restoration of normal trade relations 
(NTR), and from the EU/US side of a one-sided agreement in which China had made all the 
concessions at great commercial policy benefit to EU/US business interests.
8 
 
One of us has elsewhere written on the terms of accession for China to the WTO as being 
breathtaking in scope, particularly in key service areas (banking, telecoms, insurance) where 
seemingly the most radical liberalization commitments anywhere in the world were undertaken 
with little or no reciprocal WTO benefits achieved by China and most future bargaining chips in 
the service areas surrendered.
9  The credibility of implementation for China’s commitments by 
2007 in these areas is now an issue.  
 
One might thus well ask why was it that China was so concerned to achieve the accession 
outcome that ensued.  Firmness of MFN benefits alone cannot, in our view, explain much since 
de facto China largely received MFN benefits already, despite periods of Congressional 
agonizing in the US over human rights and labour standards.  Yongtu identified the advantages 
to China as allowing the development of China’s service sector, generating international 
acceptance for China’s economy as a market economy, allowing China some say over the setting 
of multilateral global trade rules, and greater access to dispute settlement.
10  And other countries 
(Taiwan being the extreme case) seem to have achieved remarkable long term export growth 
without formal WTO membership. 
                                                 
8 See the speech by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky of the US Trade Representative to the Economic Club of 
Washington (March 16, 2000) describing what were portrayed as China’s one-way concessions to US business 
interests.  China’s compliance with her WTO commitments is discussed in Stewart (2004). 
9 See Whalley, 2003. 
10 Yongtu, The Chinese Economy, 2000.   8
 
But now in the WTO, China’s interests will lie in both using WTO disciplines and in writing new 
WTO trade rules in ways which most effectively guarantee access to large export markets in 
Europe and North America. A central question for China in approaching the accession decision 
should, in our view, have been how far these objectives could be achieved inside the WTO rather 
than outside a system of WTO multilateral trade rules, and how the terms of accession should be 
crafted, rather than the broader security related issues of global engagement. 
 
And today, if Chinese growth rests on continued manufactured export growth fuelled by inward 
foreign investment, then this trade growth, in turn, must also rest on relatively free and secure 
access to large markets abroad. This interest has parallels to that of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s 
which has long been considered to be one of the major gainers from the post-war GATT system, 
especially, since on the whole and in the main, the GATT delivered relatively free and 
nondiscriminatory access to key export markets during a period of sharp export growth.  The 
question for China is how to use membership of the WTO to keep markets in Europe and the US 
open, as well as open further growing and increasingly important export markets in middle 
income and poorer countries.  Are there real and important opportunities, or is the reality that 
WTO membership offers relatively little extra, especially in key areas such as antidumping and 
textiles and apparel?   
 
Our discussion thus points to a strong Chinese interest in both effective WTO dispute settlement 
and ongoing WTO negotiation to improve access terms.
11   It raises also the obvious question of 
how these fora can best be utilized by China.  Should China actively pursue WTO disputes to 
                                                 
11 See also the discussion in Martin 2002.   9
open up markets abroad, or is the prospect instead one of numerous complaints against China 
fuelled by WTO membership which once inside the WTO she must spend time and energy 
dealing with.  And seemingly these must be approached inside the WTO in the intellectual 
framework of Western neo-classical economic thought, still not fully compatible with China’s 
chosen development route? 
 
The Chinese interest in strong multilateral rules also raises a further dilemma. How can this 
interest be balanced with China’s regional and more local interest to use market power in 
bilateral or regional negotiations to gain China preferential market access closer to home.  And 
what of concessions on access to the Chinese market made to foreigners as a result of WTO 
accession and Chinese concerns over the non-trade areas of intellectual property, environment, 
labour standards, competition policy and others? 
 
Finally, there are strategic issues for China in all of this which involve her national security 
interests and their links to trade and commerce which we do not discuss.  Can WTO membership 
cement key security relationships that China has?  Does joint-WTO membership for both China 
and Taiwan pose new problems, or create fresh opportunities?  Does WTO membership help or 
hurt relations with the US and Europe?  Does it allow for new leadership opportunities re the 
middle income and poorer countries which would otherwise not be available? 
 
 
3.  Some Key Short- to Medium-Term Trade and WTO Issues for China 
China is now facing a number of trade and WTO issues in the short- to medium-term, which 
affect both her access to foreign markets and the access she gives to foreigners to Chinese   10
markets.  Some of these directly involve WTO disciplines; others are broader reflecting the 
operation of the wider trading system.  If Chinese WTO membership is perceived to yield 
relatively little help in dealing with these problems, internal political commitment to WTO 
participation and even domestic policy reform might be weakened. Equally, how China 
maneouvres within the WTO process will affect global outcomes, China’s future trade 
performance, and ultimately global economic performance. 
 
Textiles and Apparel 
Near the top of the list of key access related issues for China is textiles and apparel trade and the 
prospective termination of the Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA).  China is now the dominant 
exporter of apparel items from non-OECD countries; in value terms in 2002 accounting for 
approximately 45% of non-OECD exports.  Today China and India jointly account for the 
majority of apparel exports from non-OECD to OECD countries
12 with a large number of smaller 
suppliers in Asia, Eastern Europe, Central and Latin America with small shares of total trade 
which are still a large fraction of country exports.  Sri Lanka, for instance, had 53% of total 
exports in textiles and apparel products in 2002, 
13 and these products were 95% of Bangladesh’s 
and 93% of Laotian manufactured goods exports in 2000.
14 
 
Since 1974 global trade in textiles and apparel has been restrained by the MFA
15 which followed 
the original Short and Long-Term Arrangements on Cotton Textiles first negotiated by the US 
                                                 
12 See Leading exporters and importers of clothing, 2002, Table IV.69, WTO web site. This is in sharp contrast to 
the 1980s, when Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea accounted for 60% of such exports.   
13 See Trade Policy Review: Sri Lanka, at 87, WTO web site. 
14 See Evolution of Trade in Textile and Clothing Trade, World-wide Trade Figures and Structural Data at 12, on 
Europa web site. 
15 The Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (the Multi Fibre Arrangement) came into effect on 
January 1, 1974.   11
with key Asian exporters (Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea) in 1962.
16  After four rounds 
of MFA renewal were mutually agreed to by both importing and exporting countries WTO 
members agreed to terminate the MFA at the end of 2004 in the Uruguay Round decisions in 
1994, using a complex 10-year transitional process to achieve elimination.
17   
 
The MFA operates with agreed growth rate quotas on exports, complex rules of origin, 
transshipment rules, a monitoring and a consultation mechanism (a calls system) and with 44 
exporters and eight North American and European importers.  By wide agreement, over the years 
the MFA has slowed and restrained export growth in textile and apparel products, even though 
export shares from non-OECD countries have increased considerably.   
 
Several issues now arise with its termination which affect all MFA exporters, but are especially 
critical for China.  One is whether free trade will really replace the MFA.  Scenarios for a post 
MFA elimination regime abound from a wave of new antidumping petitions from domestic 
producers in OECD countries being used to force a new market sharing regime (as happened in 
steel in the mid-1900s), to the use of safeguards measures (GATT 1994, Article 19) by OECD 
countries on textile and apparel products. 
 
The view of most developing country exporter countries have been that so far only tokenesque 
implementation of transitional arrangements by OECD countries has occurred, along with 
tightening of the application of MFA rules as it is being eliminated. The concerns in the US and 
                                                 
16 The Short Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles was negotiated in 1961, and subsequent a long term arrangement 
negotiated in 1962. See Nattapong Thongpakde and Wisarn Pupphavesa, World Bank, 1999. 
17 A paradox of this outcome was that the MFA was an arrangement mutually agreed to by developing countries that 
could have unilaterally terminated the agreement by their own decision not to agree to a renewal.   12
also in the EU over labour adjustment from affected industry groups are clear and strongly 
stated.
18  A recent piece in Asian Labour News for instance, documents pressures in the US for 
use of new selective MFA transitional safeguards against apparel imports from non-OECD 
countries.
19   
 
China’s interest is clearly in obtaining unhindered export access in this key area of Chinese trade 
performance through full access to OECD export markets for textile and apparel exports.  The 
belief is both that exports to OECD countries will grow even more rapidly under free access, and 
that higher cost production which has relocated to smaller countries in the region because of 
quotas on Chinese exports will relocate to China.  How China deals with these issues both in the 
WTO and outside could well be critical to China’s medium term trade growth. One question is 
whether China has fresh leverage now that she is inside the WTO which she can use to ensure 
smooth and effective termination of restraints on these exports?  Or is it the case that WTO 
membership makes little difference to the situation, since China was a MFA member both before 
and after WTO accession. If the former, can China now more effectively exert her leverage both 
formally and informally with other interested parties, such as India, so as to act in concert in any 
subsequent negotiations (such as on market sharing arrangements)?  Also, can China use WTO 
membership to link her position on textiles and apparel to that on other issues, including the 
remaining implementation of her accession terms?  One scenario that has been raised is that 
China may only agree to new global arrangements in the textiles and apparel area if there is 
mutual agreement from OECD countries to slow the accession implementation process in such 
services areas as banking. 
                                                 
18 See The Standard article, August 2, 2003.   
19 See Asian Labour News online article, November 19, 2003.   13
 
Anti-dumping 
China also faces many critical challenges in the area of anti-dumping.  Around 15% of anti-
dumping actions world wide now occur against China, since she is a dynamic grower of 
exports.
20  In addition, under US statute China is also currently classified as a non-market 
economy, provoking more stringent application of dumping procedures.
21  China, in turn, has 
begun to intensify her own use of anti-dumping duties.
22 
 
One issue China faces in this area is whether, realistically, it makes sense to fight anti-dumping 
actions if the legal and informational costs are high?  People’s Daily indicates that China had 
won over 37% of cases in the prior 10 years,
23 but at a high cost in legal fees and other charges.  
The current view in some circles in China is that if dumping actions against China are narrowly 
focused on particular products the simplest strategy is simply to respond by producing and 
                                                 
20  In the period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003, China was subject to 42 initiations of anti-dumping 
investigations, out of a total of 238, approx. 17.6%. See WTO Annual Report 2004, Table 11.5 Exporters Subject to 
Two or More Initiations of Anti-dumping Investigations 1 July 2002-30 June 2003 at 46 on WTO web site. In the 
preceding period, China was subject to 46 new initiations of a total 309. See WTO Annual Report 2003, Table 1I1.6 
Exporters Subject to Two or More Initiations of Anti-dumping Investigations 1 July 2001-30 June 2002 at 83 on 
WTO web site. From 1995-2001 China was subject to 14% of total global anti-dumping actions (People’s Daily, 
April 23, 2002). According to news reports, China has been subject to more than 200 anti-dumping cases since 
joining the WTO in 2001 (Oliver August, Times Online, June 3, 2004). 
21 Article 15 of the protocol on China’s accession to the WTO allows other WTO members to treat China as a non-
market economy in dumping and subsidy cases for 15 years after its entry. (China Daily, May 17, 2004).  Under US 
anti-dumping laws, once a US trade authority deems a country a non-market economy it may disregard the prices of 
products exported from the country, since they do not reflect supply and demand, and instead use costs in a third 
surrogate country to calculate dumping margins.  At a hearing on June 3/04, the US Commerce Department said US 
deliberations over whether China is a market-based or state-controlled economy would take at least as long as 
deliberations on Russia (18 months). See Cheng Dawei, China Daily, May 17, 2004, and Doug Palmer, Reuters, 
June 3, 2004.  
22 China initiated 17 anti-dumping actions in the period of July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003. See WTO Annual Report 
2003, Table 11.5:  Summary of Anti-dumping Actions, 1 July 2002 to June 30, 2003.   She initiated no actions in the 
previous year.  China filed 24 anti-dumping cases in the period from 1997 to Sept 2003.  See People’s Daily Online, 
September 14, 2003. 
23 See People’s Daily Online, March 29 2002.    14
exporting other items.  But if dumping actions continue against China, at some point the export 
product range become sufficiently restricted that export performance suffers significantly.   
 
WTO accession formally provides China with little defence against the use of anti-dumping 
measures against her. Article 6 of GATT 1994 effectively legitimizes the use of anti-dumping 
measures, and only constrains their use procedurally by specifying how domestic administrative 
tribunals should determine their use.  It is thus hard to claim that WTO membership offers China 
any significant added benefits in dealing with this major access problem facing continued export 
growth. China may be able to push more aggressively for anti-dumping reform in the WTO, long 
seen as unacceptable to the US Congress even after China’s WTO accession, but for now this 
still seems non-negotiable.  
 
Services 
In the key service areas of banking, insurance and telecoms, China faces both the task of 
implementing far reaching commitments entered into in 2001, and of trying to manoeuvre on the 
access front with few service-related bargaining chips remaining since they were effectively 
surrendered when she accepted her WTO accession terms. Elsewhere, one of us has discussed 
these issues and raised questions as to the credibility and implementability of China’s 
commitments in this area.
24 
 
In banking, China has agreed to remove all geographical restrictions on licences, and also to 
grant them in a non-discriminatory manner to both domestic and foreign entities, and to extend 
them to all types of business (including in banking to both domestic and foreign currency 
                                                 
24 See Whalley, 2003.   15
transactions).  If fully implemented, these commitments will effectively undermine the present 
fixed exchange rate Remnimbi regime, and also restrain the current practice of using state-owned 
banks in part as recapitalization agencies for loss generating state-owned enterprises (SOE).  
There has been speculation that the end of such practice will significantly weaken Chinese trade 
performance, since effective subsidization of SOEs through these devices has fuelled her trade 
growth.   
 
In insurance, the main Chinese commitment stands as one to non-discriminatory licensing for 
insurance providers and to also grant licenses free of any geographical restriction.  Foreign 
negotiators believed at the time of the accession negotiations that this would effectively open the 
Chinese insurance market to foreign providers, but for now the indications are of more 
infrequent issuance of licenses to either domestic or foreign providers and hence more 
cartelization of Chinese insurance markets.  In telecoms, the commitments relate again to the use 
of non-discriminatory licensing combined with significant liberalization in terms of foreign 
currency. 
 
The WTO challenges for China in these service areas involve both the scope of the commitments 
and the extent of change they imply for the operation of the Chinese economy.   A major and 
radical change is implied for the Chinese banking system if these commitments are fully 
implemented, since by 2007 if full implementation occurs, China will have by some measures 
the most open key service markets of any large global economy.  And all of this will have been 
agreed to with no negotiating quid pro quo in terms of access to foreign service markets and with 
potential significant labour adjustment loss, although these currently appear to be unquantified.   16
 
In this area China must try to find a way to implement what seem to be over negotiated 
commitments, or try to obtain some formal concession in the WTO (perhaps for concession in 
non-service areas) for slowed implementation of the commitments. 
 
Trade Disputes 
China also currently faces a list of trade disputes, of which some have the potential to spawn a 
significant number of new WTO dispute panels. The list of potential disputes seen from the US 
is reflected in the latest USTR Foreign Trade Barriers Report.  This itemizes import substitution 
policies in China in several product areas, such as fertilizer; automobile investment guidelines; 
tariffs on products that compete with sensitive domestic industries, such as motorcycles and 
electronic equipment; tariff classification and customs valuation procedures; Chinese border 
policies that give preferential treatment to non-US imports (such as Russian timber);
25 non-tariff 
barriers to trade in the form of regulations that set entry barriers to trade in services such as 
banking and insurance; unwarranted inspections of agriculture products; rules on biotechnology 




Thus far, only one of these disputes has resulted in a formal panel proceeding (the chips case), 
but others seem poised to be added to the list.  China has settled some of her emerging disputes 
through bilateral accommodation, but the issue for China is how far to move in this direction in 
accommodating this procedure. 
                                                 
25 Russia is not a WTO member and so this practice by China is WTO compatible. 
26  See United States Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (2004).   17
 
WTO disciplines define clear rights for other WTO members when accessing China’s markets 
for goods, services, and allowing the use of their intellectual property.  Whether by more clearly 
defining such rights accession to the WTO merely adds to the list of disputes and hence the 
pressure for change in China, or whether the added clarity of rights for other WTO members 
work to accelerate trade and investment flows is unclear.  Free traders typically argue that many 
or most of the changes that China may be pressured to make under threat of WTO process are 
anyway in China’s interest since they allow China to more fully harness the gains from trade.  
However, China’s developmental strategy thus far has not been fully reflective of an unrestricted 
market approach, and the more rapid change that is probably implied by the outcome to these 
disputes may not be seen as policy compatible in China.  China has thus to decide whether WTO 
trade disputes while superficially annoying from a practical view point, in reality help implement 
the modernization process in China more quickly and are simply a confirmation of the arguments 
that took China into the WTO in the first place.  Or do potential WTO disputes needs add new 
pressures on China to implement policy changes which she does not yet want to make. 
 
On the offensive side of the trade dispute equation, China has thus far shown considerable 
reluctance to use her WTO membership to assert her rights. There have been no WTO trade 
panels initiated by China,
27 although China has been active in pressuring foreign governments on 
various trade matters such as the use of special safeguards in textiles and apparel in the US, 
                                                 
27 Although China was the second of nine members to request a panel against the US on safeguards on imports of 
certain steel products. See Request for a Panel against US Imports of Certain Steel Products, April 2, 2002 on WTO 
web site.   18
Japanese farm measures affecting Chinese exports,




The one dispute thus far that has resulted in a formal WTO panel against China involves the 
treatment of imported semiconductor memory chips into the Chinese market.  Under the Chinese 
national value added tax, imported chips are subject to a value-added tax of 17%, but 
domestically produced chips are eligible for special tax rebates that lower the effective tax rate to 
between 3% and 6%.
30 The US allegation is that this practice is a violation of National Treatment 
(GATT 1994, Article 3), and the EU and other suppliers (including Taiwan) have also notified an 
interest in the case to the WTO.
31 
 
Other emerging trade dispute issues involving China relate to financing packages offered by 
foreign auto producers in the Chinese market, which were initially disallowed on the grounds 
that China had yet to implement its WTO commitments re financial services; 
32 and whether the 
current Remnimbi exchange rate is a factor in China’s significant trade surplus position and 
represents a GATT 1994 Article 23 nullification and impairment case. 
 
                                                 
28 See Meng Yan, China Daily, June 3, 2003.  These complaints relate to a Japanese announcement to block imports 
of Chinese fowl and eggs in May 2003 after a flue virus was detected in exports originating in Guangdong. 
29 See People’s Daily Online, Feb 17, 2004. This matter relates to a new EU directive on waste from electronic 
equipment that will impose a fee of 1 to 20 Euros on any colour TV or mobile phone exported to the EU. 
30 See The Economist, January 10, 2004 at 57. 
31 See China – value-added tax on integrated circuits – Request to Join Consultations, Communication from the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Phenghu, Kinmen and Matsu, April 5, 2004 on WTO web site, and China – 
value-added tax on integrated circuits – Request to Join Consultations, Communication from the European 
Communities, March 30,2004 on WTO web site. 
32 See Xiao Zhang, China Daily, November 14, 2003.   19
China has recently concluded a bilateral agreement on imports of coking coal from the EU, 
reflective of an approach of using bilateral accommodation to defuse trade conflicts.
33 China’s 
import quota in this area is to be sharply increased, although not removed as WTO disciplines 
would seem to imply. This case will likely lead to similar deals with other exporters of coking 
coal to the Chinese market, and possibly similar deals in other product areas. 
 
The Domestic Regulatory Regime 
A final challenge for China which WTO membership implies is the extent of refocusing of the 
domestic regulatory regime that will be in implied in the medium term.  Standards issues 
involving China’s trade figure prominently in the USTR Foreign Trade Barriers report and 
include a lack of transparency in the certification process, lack of coordination among standards 
bodies and other agencies, burdensome requirements and long processing times for licenses.
34  
US companies do claim that achieving certification under China’s Compulsory Certification 
system is time-consuming, difficult and costly, and that they are subject to redundant testing for 
cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and several consumer electronic products, inconsistent application 
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and excessive or inappropriate food labeling 
requirements.   
 
An illustration of these problems is China’s Wireless LAN encryption standards, which differ 
from internationally recognized standards and force international companies to work through the 
few Chinese manufacturers who possess the necessary algorithm to meet these standards.  
 
                                                 
33 See Dai Yan, China Daily, May 31, 2004. 
34 See United States Trade Representative, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (2004) at 67-
71.   20
According to Li Zhonghai, director of China’s standardization watchdog, China now has 20,900 
compulsory national standards covering safety, hygiene and environmental protection with more 
than 2,300 new national standards under creation. Only 44% of China’s standards reflect agreed 
international standards (also according to Li Zhonghai) and the challenge is to modify remaining 
standards and elsewhere rewrite domestic regulatory standards.  Such standard relate to health, 
safety, electrical, product liability and other matters.  Standards are widely agreed to be a central 
area of impact of domestic policy regimes on trade, and are little researched. The issues in this 
area in the Chinese case seem to be quantitatively even larger than those for other economies.  
 
4.  Regionalism, China’s Trade Policies and the WTO 
It is in the area of regional trade agreements that some of the most central trade issues arise for 
China with her WTO participation.  Thus far, China has formally initiated two regional 
agreements; an agreement with ASEAN and a bilateral agreement with Hong Kong under a 
Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (the CEPA),
35 but others seem likely to follow. 
 
The ASEAN agreement concluded in 2002 is a broad framework agreement with a specified 
bilateral tariff elimination list to be implemented by 2010.
36  This agreement has yet to be 
finalized and hence to be notified to the WTO, where a working party will have to be established 
to consider it.  China Daily, reports that initial negotiations on a China-ASEAN FTA are 
                                                 
35 See Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (2003) [CEPA] at Government of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Trade and Industry Department web site. 
36 The Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed in November 
2002, with a proposed free trade area involving 1.7 billion people.  Trade between China and ASEAN in the first 10 
months of 2002 alone was worth almost $43.46 billion (USD), by 2005 this number is expected to reach $63 billion 
(USD). See People’s Daily Online, December 17, 2002.   21
expected to conclude before June 30 2004,
37 with conclusion of the broad terms of the trade 
agreement.  Current negotiations are focused on rules of origin, trade of goods and trade of 
services and investment. An early harvest program which was launched Jan. 1, 2004, has resulted 
in preferential tariffs on more than 500 mostly agricultural goods.
38 Agriculture, information and 
communication technologies, human resources development, mutual investment and the 
development of the Mekong River have been identified as priorities for cooperation.   
 
The CEPA agreement is a tariff elimination agreement. Tariff elimination will occur by 2006.  
The two parties mutually agree to forgo the use of antidumping and countervailing duties against 
each other.  Safeguards are allowed under a prior written notice arrangement.  It also has 
significant additional provisions in a number of areas. One is in financial services since it allows 
Hong Kong banks to acquire ownership and control of Chinese banks, and through foreign 
acquisition of Hong Kong banks potentially provides for foreign entry to the Chinese banking 
market.  The CEPA commits the mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to 
progressive removal of bilateral service trade restrictions.   
 
The provisions in the financial cooperation provisions (Article 13 of CEPA) support mainland 
banks in developing network and business activities in Hong Kong and the “full utilization of 
financial intermediaries in Hong Kong during the process of reform, restructuring and 
development of the financial sector in the Mainland.”
39  There is agreement on cooperation in 
                                                 
37 See Dai Yan, China Daily, May 21, 2004. 
38 See Dai Yan, China Daily, May 21, 2004. 
39 CEPA, article 13, section 3.   22
tourism and mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and trade and investment 
facilitation. 
 
Compared to recent regional trade agreements involving OECD countries, the CEPA is notable 
for its brevity (and hence some potentially significant degree of vagueness), and its absence of an 
additional dispute resolution mechanism beyond what WTO process implies.  Disputes are to be 
resolved “through consultation in spirit of friendship and cooperation,”
40 and all decisions of the 
CEPA steering committee are to be by consensus. 
 
The CEPA has been notified to the WTO, even though China and Hong Kong are two separate 
WTO members.  As the first regional agreement to be concluded by China, this seemingly sets 
the precedent for others that will follow, including potentially for some parts of the China-
ASEAN agreement.  Other possible regional partners for China include Korea, Australia - New 
Zealand, India and even Japan.  
 
On other fronts, the Financial Times reported in 2003 that China and India have agreed to 
coordinate their WTO positions on a range of issues including essential medicines, agriculture 
and investment.
 41  In June 2003, the Indian Prime Minister visited China and agreed to form a 
joint working party to study bilateral economic cooperation and lay the way for a possible 
bilateral free trade agreement.
42  Australia and China have jointly released an Australia-China 
                                                 
40 CEPA agreement, article 19 “Institutional arrangements”, section 5.  
41 See Guy de Jonquieres, Financial Times, July 1, 2003. 
42 See Michael Vatikiotis and Murray Hiebert. Far Eastern Economic Review. April 29, 2004.   23
Free Trade Agreement Feasibility Study,
43 Singapore has begun talks on a free trade deal with 
China,
44 New Zealand has agreed to a formal bilateral trade framework with China,
45 and China, 
Japan and South Korea have met to discuss regional trade issues.
46 
 
For China, as for the US and the EU, the incentive is to adhere to strong multilateral WTO 
disciplines as a way of securing access to larger markets on non discriminatory terms, while 
seeking regional arrangements going beyond WTO rules with smaller entities giving China 
preferential regional access to smaller markets.  The current US regional agreements stress 
preferential access in services, while EU agreements stress partnership and commonality in legal 
structure.  As a large manufactured goods exporter, China’s regional agreements for now stress 
preferential access in these areas, and so the structure of China’s regional agreements will likely 
continue to differ significantly from those of other large trade entities.  Cultural differences will 
also be reflected in such areas as dispute settlement, where Asian consensus will likely be 




                                                 
43 See Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Feasibility Study, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade web site.  
44 See Chen Qide, China Daily, March 1, 2004. 
45 See Colin James, Far Eastern Review, April 22, 2004, at 20. 
46 See Jiji Press, English News Service, June 8, 2004 and Shawn Donnan and Andrew Ward, Financial Times, 
October 8, 2003.   24
5.  China, the Doha Round, Trade Relations with Other Emerging Large Middle Income 
Powers and Global Architecture 
While China is now a key player in the WTO process China is not alone in both having 
negotiating power and being able to exercise this in her own interests in WTO process.   How far 
China goes in exercising her influence jointly with other emerging middle income powers, such 
as India, Brazil and Indonesia, and powers yet to join the WTO such as Russia will be important. 
 
On the one hand, these are economies in competition with China for export growth driven access 
to large markets in the EU and the US. But on the other hand the commonality of interest 
suggests that substantial opportunities exist for collaborative activity between China and these 
other countries, both within the WTO and outside.  These are also more rapidly growing markets 
than in the OECD and increasingly are areas of significant export importance to China. 
 
In the short term, Chinese interests in the WTO Doha Round are key. Optimism or pessimism on 
its outcome will play a role, as will China’s interest in exercising leadership among the emerging 
large middle income powers in its conclusion.  Agriculture and the export subsidization issue, 
until recently dividing the EU and the US, is one issue.  But issues of implementation of 
Uruguay Round decisions preoccupying smaller and poorer countries, and associated matters of 
clarifying the interpretation of special and differential treatment also arise. 
 
China is also a country with a large rapidly-growing economy effectively outside of the global 
institutional apparatus of the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF for nearly 50 years and 
formally joining this structure in 2001.  For now China has been content to observe and move   25
cautiously, but over time fundamental issues will arise for China as to how accepting she should 
be of this structure and where and how rapidly she should push for change, and with whom. 
 
The WTO/WB/IMF triad to a large degree reflects the response of the US and the European 
powers to the immediate post-World War II concerns of achieving international economic 
stability and laying the preconditions for growth in the immediate post-1945 period.  The aim 
was to prevent a return to the 1930s and the depression and economic dislocation that occurred 
(especially in Central Europe) after the First World War. The IMF was to guarantee a fixed 
exchange rate regime, the World Bank was to yield concessional financing for infrastructure in 
developing countries, and the ITO (and later the GATT and the WTO) was to be the vehicle to 
establish rules for the use of trade policy so as to facilitate trade growth globally. 
 
But the world of today is no longer that of the 1940s, and while these agencies have changed 
over the years, whether they fully respond to the global challenges of today, especially as seen by 
China, is key.  Longer term the issue for China and even now after only recently acceding to the 
WTO, is whether she should also be a prime global mover for a wholly new and reformed global 
institutional economic architecture? 
 
Such an architecture could concentrate on issues of major concern to China more effectively then 
global institutions do at present.  One area is that of global labour mobility, with restrictions in 
OECD countries on the free flow of cheap Chinese labour abroad.  Another is the issue of 
certification procedures for the use of considerably cheaper Chinese services (medical services in   26
China for instance) in place of OECD service provisions. Other key issues involve the 
environment, anti-trust, banking regulation and how they are dealt with globally. 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
The paper looks beyond recent debate both in and outside China as to both the merits of and 
possible impacts from China’s accession to the WTO (to be implemented between 2002 and 
2007), and discusses China’s stance in the WTO in the post accession period.  China is now in 
the WTO; how to use WTO membership to serve China’s trade interest is the issue, not an 
accession process already negotiated.  Chinese growth has already changed the global economy, 
and our belief is that Chinese membership of the WTO will ultimately change both global 
economic performance and the shape of global economic institutions.  We are at the start of this 
process, and here we try to raise a series of issues for wider debate. 
 
Chinese is so large in population terms and, along with India, growing so rapidly that change in 
the global economy is now reflective of what is happening in China.  Trade is a central part of 
this change, how China responds to the challenges she faces both in the WTO and outside it will 
affect future global performance and is of importance to us all, whether inside or outside China.  
We ask how much difference formal WTO membership realistically makes to China’s conduct of 
commercial diplomacy, especially in key areas such as textiles and apparel, anti-dumping, and 
handling emerging trade disputes.  We also ask what this implies for China’s interests in possible 
new global economic architecture.  
   27
China now stands in contrast to nearly all the major economic powers in seemingly building its 
latest developmental strategy around her accession to the WTO and implementation of accession 
terms.  Outside China, the WTO does not enter domestic policy formation in this central way and 
there is much pessimism as to the WTO’s prospects.  On access issues, seemingly the WTO 
yields China less than the rhetoric of Chinese accession suggested and China’s new found 
regional strategy is in part a manifestation of this.  Whether the WTO will occupy the same 
central role in Chinese policy making in future years thus now seems to be in doubt.  28
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